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The human motivation of the participants is clearly at the heart of any violent 
situation.  If a conflict is to be avoided or stopped, this motivation must be 
understood, and the predisposing conditions reduced or eliminated….  
[Unfortunately], it is rarely possible to disentangle political, cultural and 
economic elements, as each is embedded in the other.1 





“Conflict is bad.”2  Simplistic though it is, this categorical statement by a deputy director in the 
State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) offers 
a concise view of the developing U.S. stance toward international security.  Worldwide 
sensitivity to civil conflict’s contribution to cyclical patterns of poverty, humanitarian disasters, 
global lawlessness, and regional instability is growing rapidly.  From a U.S. geopolitical 
perspective, increasing levels of localized violence threaten severe spillover effects, such as 
preventing access to foreign trade outlets, undermining freedom of the seas and global 
commerce, and creating safe havens for terrorist development.3  This last concern in particular 
has prompted the United States to explore assuming more responsibility for controlling global 
civil conflict.  However, the conditions that enable the outbreak of civil conflict and sustain it are 
difficult to distinguish. 
 
 
Globalization and the Spread of Localized Violence 
 
Among the key determinants Frances Stewart highlights, economic distribution has gained 
prominence in the context of widespread globalization.  Conventional economic thought credits 
the process of globalization with equalizing national economies.  Trade liberalization and similar 
                                                 
1 Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” Oxford Development Studies 28, no. 3 
(2000), 246. 
2 S/CRS Deputy Director, personal interview at U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), April 10, 2009. 
3 For further discussion of safe havens and ungoverned areas, see Robert D. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Threats 
from Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project” (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Policy Planning, 2008), 17-20. 
2 
 
policies have spurred per capita growth rates in developing countries, resulting in convergence 
with the developed world.  Recently, however, the convergence thesis has come under intense 
scrutiny.  Household-level analysis by the World Bank’s Branko Milanovic reveals that 
“openness” (an indicator for trade liberalization and the factors of globalization more broadly) 
increases inequality within severely underdeveloped states, and only after a country reaches a 
certain threshold of development does openness diminish inequality.4  This reinterpretation of the 
impact of globalization is fundamental to any analysis of contemporary civil conflict. 
 
According to data collected by the Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM), the incidence of violent conflict worldwide has been declining 
significantly since 1987.5  At first glance, this trend signals the emergence of a more united 
global community and corroborates the globalization convergence thesis.  However, the decline 
is more likely a result of the end of the Cold War and the abandonment of great power proxy 
wars.  In fact, violent conflict spiked in the late 1990s and again in 2005.  The number of inter-
state conflicts, meanwhile, dropped to zero in 2004 and has remained constant, revealing that an 
eruption of internal conflicts drove the recent, sharp increase in global violence.6  This latest 
trend contradicts the image of a global transformation toward a more peaceful world.  Rather, it 
suggests a transition to a different kind of conflict that is dominated by internal strife, localized 
violence, and global insurgency (international terrorist networks). 
 
Milanovic’s and CIDCM’s findings imply that a complex relationship exists between global and 
local dynamics.  Coincident to the spread of globalization, internal inequalities have increased in 
underdeveloped states, and localized violence and internal conflicts have flared.  Understanding 
this link between global economic dynamics and local outbreaks of violence has significant 
policy implications for restraining international conflict. 
 
 
Economic Inequity and Civil Conflict 
 
It seems intuitive that economic inequity would encourage conflict, but empirical evidence for 
such a conclusion is inconsistent at best.  Most analyses that test the effects of economic 
inequality on civil conflict take a macro-level approach, using variables like the Gini coefficient 
to measure aggregate inequality against a state’s aggregate violence.  These cross-national 
                                                 
4 Branko Milanovic, “Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on Income Distribution?: Evidence from 
Household Budget Surveys,” Policy Research Working Paper 2876, The World Bank (August 2002), 20. 
5 J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2008 (College Park, MD: The 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), 2008), 12.  Also see online resource 




studies miss the micro-level dynamics of economic inequity within a state, such as the relative 
composition of municipalities that suffer more or less violence during civil conflict.  These 
dynamics could offer significant insight into the effectiveness of conflict prevention strategies.  
Macro-level approaches fail to account for the variation of conflict over time and space, such as 
the seemingly temporary dip in worldwide conflict evident in the CIDCM data.  Micro-level 
analysis, however, has significant explanatory potential, as local inequities can reflect the impact 
of changing global dynamics. 
 
While macro-level evidence for the effect of economic inequity on the incidence and severity of 
civil violence is inconclusive, micro-level economic factors have been too difficult to 
systematically isolate.  The scarcity of comprehensive data contributes to analytical reliance on 
macro-level studies.  Furthermore, researchers have struggled to disentangle the effects of 
economic inequity from ethnic/cultural relationships and political motivations.  Ultimately, 
however, this may prove to be unimportant.  Rather than forcing data with clear limitations 
through a systematic quantitative framework, piecing together anecdotal snapshots of conflicts 
that have reliable micro-level data may provide the most useful picture of global civil conflict.  
This puzzle-piece approach would enable a more comprehensive evaluation of the complicating 
sociopolitical factors at play in a conflict.  Understanding the dynamic interplay between 
economic inequity and other micro-level sociopolitical identities and grievances offers the most 
comprehensive picture of localized violence, and the most relevance for policy prescriptions 





In a 1989 paper, Mark Lichbach reviewed 43 macro-level quantitative studies of economic 
inequality (measured alternately by land distribution, income, and economic repression by 
government) and political conflict, finding that conclusions were wildly contradictory.7  Two 
distinct, and opposing, models of conflict emerged.  The first model observes civil conflict 
increasing with economic inequality: 
 
When economic inequality is high, (1) the poor are envious, have nothing to 
lose, and thus resort to force (e.g. political violence) to achieve redistributive 
demands; (2) the rich are greedy, have everything to lose, and possess the 
resources necessary to use force (e.g. governmental repression) to avoid 
                                                 
7 Mark I. Lichbach, “An Evaluation of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?’ Studies,” World 
Politics 41, no. 4 (July 1989), 435-445.  Studies reviewed by Lichbach include, Edward Mitchell (1968, 1969), 
Dennis Paranzino (1972), William Morgan and Terry Clark (1973), Walter Barrows (1976), Ted Gurr (1968), 
Manoucher Parvin (1973), Thomas Havrilesky (1980), Fred Kort (1952), Jack Nagel (1974), Melissa Hardy 
(1979), Erich Weede (1987), Ernest Duff and John McCamant (1976), G. Bingham Powell (1982), Anthony 
Russo (1972), Doug McAdam (1982), and Seymour Spilerman (1971). 
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giving in to redistributive demands; and (3) the middle class, which respects 
property rights, is small.  Hence, as economic inequality increases, the pool of 
conflict participants (both the rich and the poor) increases.8 
 
The second model observes the opposite.  Civil conflict decreases with economic inequality 
because the same aggrieved population in the previous model is, by definition, disempowered: 
 
High levels of economic inequality are associated with powerful elites.  These 
“haves” will be willing and able to use social, economic, and political power 
to repress, and hence hold down, political dissent.9 
 
Both of these models present conflict as a simple equation of economic grievance and 
sociopolitical empowerment. 
 
Other studies reviewed by Lichbach, however, embraced more complicated explanations.  
Several observe convex distributions of civil conflict, finding that an “optimum level of income 
inequality exists” where a society is stable and that, as inequality dips or spikes beyond this 
equilibrium, violence will increase (creating a U-shaped distribution).  Others claim the opposite, 
suggesting that civil conflict is greatest at intermediate levels of inequality, because the 
“tendency to compare” diminishes as inequality increases, due to the presence of defined social 
cleavages (holding other variables constant, this results in an inverted U-shaped distribution).  
Many other studies cite non-inequality factors, such as absolute poverty, social comparisons, and 
mobilization processes as the primary determinants of conflict.10 
 
Manus Midlarsky offers the most pertinent conclusion regarding the conflicting evidence, 
asserting that such explorations are “context-specific.”11  Variations in context and detailed 
methodology, however, are not sufficient to account for the incongruous results of Cold War-era 
macro-level studies.  Unfortunately, recent cross-national quantitative analyses are just as 
conflicting. 
 
Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti’s 1996 examination of 71 countries for the period 1960-
1985 finds that “inequality increases socio-political instability [measured in violence].”12  
Alternatively, James Fearon and David Laitin’s 2003 analysis of civil war in 161 countries 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 436-437. 
9 Ibid., 437-438. 
10 Ibid., 438-440. 
11 Ibid., 440. 
12 Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” European 
Economic Review 40 (1996), 1209-1225. 
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during the period 1945-1999 tests inequality using Gini coefficients.  They find that inequality 
does “not come close to either statistical or substantive significance…. There appears to be no 
powerful cross-national relationship between inequality and onset [of conflict].”13 
 
The most influential work done in the past decade on the relationship between economics and 
civil conflict is by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.  Their earliest research framed civil conflict 
as a simple cost-benefit transaction, weighing personal insecurity against “the potential revenue 
of the government and hence the taxable base” gained by capturing the state.14  Several iterations 
of their quantitative analysis later, their base framework remains relatively consistent that 
rebellions run on business models—perceiving profits to be made from capturing the state, using 
grievance language as image promotion, and focusing primarily on financial sustainability.  As 
such, “it is the feasibility of predation that determines the risk of conflict.”15  Using cross-
national data on 161 countries for the period 1960-1999, they find that “inequality, whether of 
incomes or of assets, has no discernible effect.  Unequal societies are not more prone to conflict, 
although conflicts in unequal societies do seem to last longer.”16  They argue, rather, that civil 
conflict depends on the ability to financially sustain a rebellion in order to “loot” the state’s 
resources.  As such, states with GDP concentrated in commodity exports are more susceptible to 
violence because predatory rebel groups can “tax,” or extort, these industries.17 
 
Although Collier and Hoeffler’s work presents robust results, its conclusions are disputable.  
James Fearon points out that their reliance on natural resources as the primary determinant of 
civil war overlooks the tendency of such countries to have “weaker state institutions,” thereby 
making them more vulnerable to violence.18  Even the connection between primary commodities 
and civil conflict is not universally accepted.  Michael Ross’ 2004 literature review reveals 
mixed findings on whether GDP concentration in resource exports causes civil war.19  Among the 
                                                 
13 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 85. 
14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998), 564. 
15 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: 
Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester Crocker, et al. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2007), 199. 
16 Ibid., 203.  For full statistical results, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 
Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), 578-579. 
17 Collier, 201-206. 
18 James D. Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 
2005), 502. 
19 Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace Research 41, 
no. 3 (2004), 339.  Studies reviewed by Ross include, Havard Hegre (2002), Marta Reynal-Querol (2002), 




studies reviewed, Fearon and Laitin’s findings are stark, “Neither the share of primary 
commodity exports in GDP nor its square is remotely significant.”20  Ross concludes, “The claim 
that primary commodities are associated with the onset of civil war does not appear to be 
robust.”21 
 
Beyond contradictions in statistical analyses, however, Collier and Hoeffler’s work suffers from 
weaknesses characteristic of the macro-level approach they employ.  Associating commodity 
exports with rebel predation paints over potential micro-level dynamics with an overly broad 
stroke.  Commodity exports, for instance, may serve as a proxy for economic inequity, as GDP is 
concentrated in a few industries that are likely geographically distinct and dominated by an elite 
ownership class or the central government.  Primary commodities are also extremely visible 
sources of wealth and thereby exacerbate perceived inequality within the state.  Furthermore, as 
isolated, easily dominated physical assets, commodity exports produce what Midlarsky describes 
as “zero-sum patterns of class polarization” and ruler/ruled social interactions.22  This zero-sum 




Collier and Hoeffler’s most recent work disowns classical categorizations of conflict in favor of 
the “feasibility hypothesis,” though their continued focus on predation places them firmly on the 
greed side of the ongoing “greed-grievance” debate.23  In general, this debate continues to 
dominate political economy approaches to civil conflict.  Mats Berdal and David Malone’s 
seminal Greed and Grievance focuses on disagreements about the agendas of actors engaged in 
violence, namely whether civil wars represent legitimate revolutions, or rather, criminal attempts 
to control state resources and infrastructure.24 
 
Olu Arowobusoye, a Nigerian scholar, rejects the paternalistic application of greed theory to 
West African conflicts, asserting that even “predatory” groups are often motivated not by pure 
criminality, but simply by a belief “that they can share and provide these resources, goods and 
services themselves.”25  Similarly, an extensive quantitative analysis performed by Macartan 
                                                 
20 Fearon and Laitin, 87. 
21 Ross, 352. 
22 Lichbach, 453. 
23 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” 
Oxford Economic Papers 61 (2009), 2. 
24 Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 3. 
25 Olu Arowobusoye, “Why They Fight: An Alternative View on the Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict 
Transformation” (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), 7. 
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Humphreys (2005) reveals mixed results for various greed-grievance assertions, but “finds 
stronger support for the weak state structures and grievance hypotheses than for the booty futures 
or state capture hypotheses.”26  Humphreys’ conclusion is about as useful as any, as the discourse 
has become almost purely academic due to the contradicting results flowing from the macro-
level nature of the debate. 
 
 
Unconventional Approaches:  
Exploring Perceived Inequity and Relative Deprivation 
 
Contemporary approaches to explaining the outbreak of conflict can make important 
contributions to analysis of economic inequality.  Carol Graham explores happiness as an 
alternative variable to conventional economic indicators.  She asserts that measurements such as 
the Gini coefficient are too static, failing to adequately account for the “intergenerational 
transmission of opportunities.”27  Furthermore, such hard economic figures fail to depict the 
power of perceived inequity.  For instance, upward mobility, a classic proxy for economic 
opportunity, does not tell the whole story of micro-level socioeconomic dynamics.  Evidence 
from Peru reveals that the negative effects of downward mobility, or the “vulnerability of falling 
into poverty,” outweigh the positive effects of upward mobility, thereby exacerbating perceived 
inequity.  Furthermore, frustration is more highly concentrated among urban and older 
populations.28  Highlighting the vulnerabilities of certain populations to fall into poverty over 
time is a distinct economic indicator and requires micro-level analysis.  Macro approaches fail to 
account for the time component and the effect of economic vulnerability—as opposed to 
economic potential—as these measures rely heavily on sociopolitical perceptions. 
 
Robert MacCulloch uses a similar framework but focuses on discontent.  He maps survey 
preferences for revolt, as a measure of discontent, to people’s economic rank in society.  
Although recognizing that “low upward mobility in times of rising GDP may increase discontent 
if the poor perceive their chances of becoming rich are low,” he finds that inequality, more 
generally, is insignificant as an indicator of discontent and propensity towards civil conflict.29  
Discontent studies incorporate analysis of the psychological and emotional motivations behind 
                                                 
26 Macartan Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 2005), 534. 
27 Carol Graham, “Happiness and Hardship: Lessons from Panel Data on Mobility and Subjective Well Being in 
Peru and Russia,” Paper Prepared for World Bank Workshop on Understanding Growth and Freedom from the 
Bottom Up [DRAFT] (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 2. 
28 Ibid., 4-5. 
29 Robert MacCulloch, “The Impact of Income on the Taste for Revolt,” American Journal of Political Science 48, 
no. 4 (October 2004), 831. 
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civil violence.  David Keen observes that bottom-up violence, even when classified as non-
economically motivated, often results from deep social and economic exclusion.  He asserts that 
“even genocide can have an economic purpose” as alienated perpetrators use “violence to 
provide [an immediate] sense of ‘worth’ in a society that offer[s] minimal respect or 
opportunity.”30  Ted Gurr’s extensive quantitative analyses of such intrinsic aspects of rebellion 
and civil conflict corroborate Keen’s observations.  Focusing on the sociopolitical organization 
of states, he tests aspects of relative deprivation, value expectations, value capabilities, social 
control, social facilitation, rebellion, mobilization, grievances, and repression.  His results reveal 
that discontent sparks civil conflict.31 
 
Analyzing civil conflict through a criminal justice lens provides further insight into the 
importance of relative deprivation.  In a 2002 study of violent crime, Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel 
Lederman, and Norman Loayza test the sociological theory that “inequality breeds social 
tensions as the less well-off feel dispossessed when compared with wealthier people.”32  They 
find that economic inequality “has a positive and significant effect on homicide rates…. If the 
Gini index falls permanently by the within-country standard deviation in the sample [indicating 
greater societal equality]… the intentional homicide rate will decrease by 3.7 percent in the short 
run and 20 percent in the long run…. [Importantly,] it is not the level of income that matters for 
crime but the income differences among the population.”33  Although violent crime is not a 
perfect surrogate for civil conflict, the application of relative deprivation as a determinant of a 
state’s propensity for violence is instructive.  Edward Muller, Henry Dietz, and Steven Finkel 
(1991) note the significant impact of relative deprivation on societal discontent in their analysis 
of rebellion in Peru.34  This micro-level tendency for inter-group comparisons is applicable to 





                                                 
30 David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, The International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
Adelphi Paper 320 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 47-49. 
31 Ted Robert Gurr, Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence (Washington, DC: American University, Center for 
Research in Social Systems, 1969), 76; Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-
Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s,” American Journal of Political Science 41, 
no. 4 (1997), 1091. 
32 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law and 
Economics XLV (April 2002), 2. 
33 Ibid., 17-19. 
34 Edward N. Muller, Henry A. Dietz, and Steven E. Finkel, “Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The 
Case of Peru,” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991), 1280. 
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Although there has been little systematic research done on micro-level economic determinants of 
conflict, Frances Stewart’s analysis of civil war in Uganda provides a useful theoretical 
framework.  He argues that while most studies of conflict focus on macro-level vertical 
inequality, micro-level horizontal inequalities are more likely to cause conflict. 
 
The prime cause of conflict arises from inequalities among groups, i.e. their 
relative position [in society]….35 
 
Income distribution is a vertical measure, which takes everyone in society 
from ‘top’ to ‘bottom,’ recording incomes and the consequent inequality.  
What is needed for our analysis is a horizontal measurement of inequality 
between groups, defined by region/ethnicity/class/religion, according to the 
most appropriate type of group identification in the particular society…. 
 
It is possible to have sharp vertical inequality in any dimension without any 
horizontal inequality, e.g. if the average income of all groups were the same 
and distribution within each group was highly unequal.  Conversely, it is 
possible to have considerable inter-group inequality, while overall societal 
vertical inequality is moderate because intra-group inequality is small. 
 
Strong intra-group vertical inequality may actually reduce the potential for 
inter-group conflict for any given degree of horizontal inequality because it 
may be more difficult to get group cohesion where there is high intra-group 
inequality, and because elite members may identify more with members of the 
elite from other groups than with lower-income members of their own group.  
This broadly may be the Kenya situation.  However, this is not always the 
case; strong vertical inequality within groups can lead to intra-group 
resentments which group leaders “buy” off by directing animosity against 
other groups—this crudely summaries the Rwandan case…. 
 
The extent of horizontal inequality may be summarized using such measures 
as the Gini coefficient, the Theil index or the coefficient of variation, applied 
to groups, not individuals as is normal in measuring vertical inequality, to 
indicate the dispersion of achievements among groups…. Persistence in 
inequalities over time, and the trend in the differentials, i.e. whether they are 
widening or narrowing, are also relevant.36 
 
Stewart’s premise completely invalidates macro-level approaches.  Cross-national inequality 
measures do not capture the true inequity dynamics within a country, as macro variables could be 
depicting either inter- or intra-group relationships. 
 
                                                 
35 Stewart, 248. 
36 Ibid., 253. 
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Identifying a society’s sociopolitical cleavages is often as challenging as determining against 
which economic indicators it is most appropriate to measure relative and perceived inequality 
(e.g. land, livestock, human capital, and communal resources such as water, minerals, and 
infrastructure).  Nevertheless, Stewart asserts that such horizontal inequity measures represent 
the key determinants of civil conflict.  Qualitative analysis of violence in Uganda for the period 
of 1959-1991 fits this horizontal inequality framework, as the politically dominant North 
perpetrated violence on the economically dominant South.37 
 
E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen (2003) provide further evidence for the impact of 
horizontal inequity on conflicts in Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and Mexico.  They find, “The 
risk of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities by class, region, and 
community, especially when these disparities lack legitimacy among the population.”38  Randall 
Blimes (2006) finds that “ethnic fractionalization” has a significant and positive “indirect” effect 
on the probability of civil war onset.  He observes that “ethnic composition itself is not a cause 
of civil conflict but rather increases the likelihood that other variables that can increase the 
likelihood of civil war onset will have an effect.”39 
 
Tim Gulden and Stathis Kalyvas also focus on the micro-level effects of sociopolitical identity.  
Kalyvas (2006) examines conflict during the post-WWII political upheaval in Greece (1943-
1949), finding that violence broke out in towns where the population had an ideological 
imbalance.  Towns with roughly equal populations of each ideological identity, however, enjoyed 
relative peace.40  Gulden’s (2002) mapping of ethnic distribution and killing during Guatemala’s 
civil war (1977-1986) produces strikingly similar results.41  Further analysis of Gulden’s dataset 
reveals that the demographic imbalance of ethnic identity caused a significant increase in the 
severity of violence once it erupted.42 
 
Understanding this interaction between sociopolitical identities and economic inequity could 
provide invaluable insight into identifying states at risk for civil violence.  However, data 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 249. 
38 E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, Economic Development, Inequality, and War (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 91. 
39 Randall J. Blimes, “The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (August 2006), 542. 
40 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 288-289. 
41 Tim Gulden, “Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Civil Violence: Guatemala 1977-1986,” Center on Social and 
Economic Dynamics Working Paper No. 26 (Washington, DC: Brookings Center on Social and Economic 
Dynamics, 2002), 3-7. 
42 Michael Kniss, “Violence and Ethnic Identity: Quantitative Analysis of Killing in Guatemala 1978-1986” 
(December 2008), unpublished ms. 
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measuring horizontal inequality is scarce, and it is yet unclear whether this framework can 
provide a robust and systematic quantitative model.  Nevertheless, the application of Stewart’s 
theory to individual case studies offers perhaps the most promising approach to analyzing micro-
level determinants of civil conflict. 
 
Although outside of Stewart’s theoretical framework, Klaus Deininger’s 2003 work on Uganda 
from 1992-1999 presents an extensive micro-level analysis of the determinants of civil conflict.  
He initially assumes that conflict will decrease as the opportunity cost for an individual of 
joining a rebellion becomes more expensive and that resource concentration will increase 
conflict.  However, citing the inability of macro-level approaches to distinguish “country level 
fixed effects,” he structures his model to assess “the variation in levels of civil strife across 
communities within [Uganda]….  Since the policy regime is the same throughout the country by 
definition, a large set of possibly influential factors that are generally unobservable in cross-
country regressions is eliminated even if cross-sectional estimation is used.”43 
 
Deininger finds that greed elements (i.e. resources) increase the likelihood of civil conflict, as do 
lower levels of education, infrastructure access, and asset endowments.44  He also finds that 
“physical attacks are estimated to increase with levels of education and wealth inequality… and 
to be more prevalent in the North and the West, as well as in coffee growing areas” (regions of 
more distinct inequities).45  This finding implies that inequity becomes more significant as 
violence becomes more localized, down to the level of individual violence.  Interestingly, the 
model also produces evidence of the importance of perceived inequity.  Despite higher statistical 
significance on other determinants of civil conflict, “24% of communities viewed poverty as the 
main issue.”46  Deininger’s robust results on the importance of both relative and perceived 
economic inequity contrast sharply with the blanket conclusions of the macro-level studies. 
 
The one aspect missing from Deininger’s analysis is a discussion of horizontal inequality.  
Addressing internal ethnic, tribal, and/or cultural dynamics in Uganda would make his already 
robust results even more comprehensive.  Even macro-level studies, such as those conducted by 
Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), recognize the critical role that kin groups play 
in African society.  They represent “long-lasting institutions that have themselves developed 
rewards and penalties to ensure compliance… [such as] dispens[ing] patronage to their own 
group.”47  Adding this layer of sociopolitical dynamics is extremely difficult due to data 
                                                 
43 Klaus Deininger, “Causes and Consequences of Civil Strife: Micro-Level Evidence from Uganda,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 55 (2003), 583-584. 
44 Ibid., 603.  
45 Ibid., 596. 
46 Ibid., 597. 
47 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?: Understanding and 
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limitations, and there is no definitive understanding of what this complicating relationship would 
do to quantitative models.  
 
Nevertheless, the key to understanding how global trends affect horizontal inequity lies in the 
ability to account for the interaction between these micro-level factors.  Elbadawi and Sambanis’ 
research suggests that political and economic elites in the developing world receive windfalls 
from foreign investment and increased trade and often pass on the benefits to a clearly delineated 
subset of society.  Branko Milanovic’s studies have similarly shown that economic growth 
disproportionately benefits sociopolitical elites and is thus anti-poor.48  These trends interact to 
exacerbate horizontal inequity and increase relative and perceived deprivation across 





Because macro-level approaches provide incomplete and contradictory explanations of variations 
in violence between and within conflicts, robust micro-level analysis is required.  The horizontal 
inequity framework offers a promising alternative for illuminating the complex local dynamics 
that affect the incidence and severity of civil violence.  The initial quantitative results from a few 
case studies reveal the significant explanatory power of this approach.  The framework’s focus 
on variables that policymakers can monitor and address for more effective civil violence 
prevention programs further enhances its practical utility. 
 
Using the horizontal inequity framework for statistical modeling of additional civil-conflict case 
studies will facilitate policy-oriented conclusions, but robust qualitative analysis is integral to 
interpreting the quantitative findings.  The localized character of civil conflict does not naturally 
conform to clean regression models.  Gulden observes that patterns of civil violence “are 
generally indicative of ‘complex systems’ behavior.”49  After observing the importance of 
perceived inequity in Uganda, Deininger similarly caveats his final regression results:  “Variables 
of high statistical significance are not necessarily the ones that are… the most important.”50  An 
ample qualitative understanding of the society in conflict can overcome the inability of statistical 
modeling to account for certain complicating factors, thereby strengthening policy insight. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Preventing Violent Conflict,” Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000), 264. 
48 Branko Milanovic and Lire Ersado, “Reform and Inequality during the Transition: An Analysis Using Panel 
Household Survey Data, 1990–2005,” Policy Research Working Paper 4780, The World Bank (November 2008), 
17. 
49 Gulden, 2, 16. 
50 Deininger, 593. 
13 
 
This dual-layered analytic approach becomes even more important in a world where extensive 
compilations of micro-level data are almost nonexistent.  Just as qualitative analysis can remedy 
certain limitations in statistical modeling, so too can it provide a parallel construct to resolve 
gaps and imperfections present in available data.  As conflict case studies with reliable data are 
pieced together, a comprehensive picture of the impact of global horizontal inequity dynamics on 
civil violence may emerge.  Effectively applying multifaceted micro-level analysis today will be 
crucial for encouraging future large-scale data collection and collaboration between government 
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